Author: Max Botnick
Date: 2026-04-18
Status: Draft v0.1
Executive Summary. This proposal presents a mechanism design for flat universal basic income distributed via the ASI Chain. The central challenge is Sybil resistance: ensuring each recipient is a unique human. Rather than threshold-based identity gates (which are inherently gameable), we propose an attestation market where the defense is purely economic: making attacks continuously more expensive than extraction. Trust is quantified using Non-Axiomatic Logic (NAL) truth values natively on-chain via MeTTa contracts, enabling graduated confidence rather than binary approval.
On-chain UBI faces a fundamental tension: the more valuable the benefit, the greater the incentive to fabricate identities. Existing approaches (biometric scanning, social vouching with fixed quorums, government ID bridging) all introduce thresholds that rational attackers will optimize to barely clear.
The design principle: no thresholds, only cost curves. The system must be unprofitable to attack, not unbreakable. Every dimension of attack (capital, time, reputation, coordination) must carry a continuous economic cost that exceeds expected extraction.
We also argue for flat distribution over needs-weighted: weighted distribution requires a needs-assessment oracle that becomes a new attack surface. Flat UBI reduces the problem to a single binary question: is this a unique human? Off-chain complementary programs can address needs-targeting without compromising on-chain security.
Attesters are economic agents who stake ASI tokens as collateral to vouch for identity claims. Each attestation is a NAL truth value (stv frequency confidence) recorded on-chain, where confidence scales with the attester's stake and track record.
When multiple independent attesters vouch for the same identity, their truth values are combined via NAL revision. This yields compounding confidence:
| Attesters (n=) | Indep=1.0 | Indep=0.7 | Indep=0.3 | Indep=0.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.400 | 0.400 | 0.400 | 0.400 |
| 3 | 0.784 | 0.664 | 0.517 | 0.462 |
| 12 | 0.998 | 0.969 | 0.724 | 0.617 |
Key finding: Correlated attesters (low independence) plateau rapidly. This is the mathematical proof that delegation concentration into few mega-attesters destroys confidence growth. The protocol naturally incentivizes diversity: more independent attesters yield higher confidence, which unlocks larger distributions faster. S## 3. Economic Security Model
Core invariant: total cost of maintaining a Sybil must exceed cumulative UBI extracted.
Total attack cost = S * (r_slash + r_opp * T)
S=staked collateral, r_slash=slash rate, r_opp=opportunity cost rate, T=lock duration.
| Lock | Slash | Opp | Total | UBI | Cost/UBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1mo | 200 | 1.7 | 201.7 | 100 | 2.02x |
| 3mo | 200 | 5.0 | 205.0 | 300 | 0.68x |
| 12mo | 200 | 20 | 220 | 1200 | 0.18x |
| 24mo | 200 | 40 | 240 | 2400 | 0.10x |
S=400 ASI, U=100 ASI/mo, slash=50%, opp=5% p.a.
One-time staking amortizes, making long-running Sybils profitable. Solution: mandatory re-attestation every P months with escalating stake if no independent corroboration.
Honest attesters earn fees. Dishonest attesters face slashing. Equilibrium: fee > due diligence cost, AND slash risk * stake > fee for fraud.
Each attestation is a MeTTa expression with NAL truth value. Revision of independent attestations compounds confidence. Correlated attesters plateau, naturally incentivizing diversity. Confidence-graduated distribution: c<0.3 no payout, 0.3-0.7 partial, >=0.7 full.
MeTTa-native contracts via MeTTaCycle. ASI token staking (8 decimals, gas 0.0025 ASI). On-chain NAL truth values. Treasury funded via inflation + fee allocation.
Living document. v0.2 will add simulation results.